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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940684-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.

See also Utah R. Crim.

P. 26(2) (a) .
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief
or in Addendum A:
Utah
U.S.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Const, art. I, § 12
Const, amend. VI
R. Crim. P. 22
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
Code Ann. § 76-3-201
Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(g)
Code Ann. § 77-28-2
Code Ann. § 77-28a-2
Code Ann. § 77-29-1
Code Ann. § 77-29-5
Code Ann. § 77-29-7

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
If a court indefinitely suspends sentencing proceedings of a
defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction and the State does
nothing to secure the defendant's return to Utah, since the Utah
sentence may never be imposed does the Utah court subsequently
lose jurisdiction over the matter?

See (R 170-86; 247-93; 295-

327) (motion and arguments to vacate sentence based on lack of
jurisdiction).

Grayson

Roper

Ltd.

v. Finlinson,

782 P.2d 467,

470 (Utah 1989) ("A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded
no particular deference"); State

v.

Petersen,

810 P.2d 421, 425

(Utah 1991) ("trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the
law"); cf.

State

v. Montoya,

825 P.2d 676 (Utah App. 1991)

("Because the issue goes to jurisdiction, this court can raise
the issue sua sponte and at any time").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant/
appellant's motion to vacate his sentence, a ruling dated October
21, 1995, and rendered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding.
(R 203, 206-10).
On July 27, 1989, a jury convicted Mr. Rogelio Limonta Leyva
of three counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) .

(R 55, 79, 103-05).

On August 28,

1989, (R 74), the date originally set for sentencing, the court
ordered Mr. Leyva to "be released to beehive bond" and
2

rescheduled the proceeding for a later date.

(R 110).

Sentencing was rescheduled on three different instances and then
addressed by the court on January 16, 1990.x

(R 111-14; 116-17;

122-23) .

On January 16, 1990, " It]he
date11

without

sentencing

[was!

continued

after the court had been advised "that the

defendant is incarcerated in San Bernadino, CA.'"
(emphasis added).

(R 125)

The court issued a bench warrant for

Mr. Leyva's return although it was directed only at Utah law
enforcement officers.

(R 125-26).

Following his period of confinement in San Bernadino on
California charges, immigration authorities (INS) held Mr. Leyva
without filing federal charges while they considered deportation
proceedings.

(R 239). Even though Mr. Leyva was not deported,

he was held and transported repeatedly to numerous
penitentiaries.

(R 238-40; 272-72) (Rogelio was imprisoned in

Chino, California; Shakawala, Arizona; Susanville, California;
Donovan, California; Chula Vista, California; El Centro,
1

On September 25, 1989, at 4:30 p.m., after Mr. Leyva had
appeared in court with counsel, the sentencing proceeding was
continued until November 13, 1989. (R 114). On "motion of the
defense, the court [again] continue[d] the sentencing for
[Rogelio Limonta] from 11/13/89 to 11/27/89 @ 9 A.M."
(R 117);
see also
(R 112-14; 116-17) (a presentence report had not been
prepared by AP&P on either occasion because Mr. Leyva reportedly
missed the scheduled appointments). On November 27, 1989,
defense counsel telephoned the court to inform it counsel had
been trapped by a snowstorm and was unable to attend the
sentencing.
(R 255). The matter was continued until December
11, 1989. (R 122). Finally, due to the unexpected
hospitalization of defense counsel, the case was continued until
January 16, 1990. (R 123, 255).
3

California; Limestone County, Texas; Terra Haute, Indiana;
Tucson, Arizona; and Inglewood, Colorado.).
On March 4, 1994, after being incarcerated for over four
years in state and federal institutions, Rogelio Leyva was
returned to Utah for sentencing on his 1989 charges.

Defense

counsel did not challenge the court's jurisdiction or the
unreasonable delay in sentencing.

(R 233-45).

Rather, defense

counsel, together with the State and Adult Parole and Probation,
recommended a sentence of probation in recognition of the
incarceration already served by Mr. Leyva.

(R 236-3 7) .

The court here imposed a sentence of one-to-fifteen years in
prison for each of his three 1989 convictions.

The three terms

ran concurrently, with a fine imposed of $10,000.

(R 242).

The

court immediately suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Leyva on
probation for 36 months.

(R 242).

During an Order to Show Cause proceeding, dated August 12,
1994, AP&P alleged that Mr. Leyva had violated his probation.
(R 141-44).

Mr. Leyva denied the allegations.

During the same

proceeding, Loni Deland withdrew as counsel for Mr. Leyva and the
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed to continue
representation.

(R 157).

Newly appointed counsel then challenged the revocation
proceeding on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the underlying
sentence of probation had been illegally imposed.

See

(R 170-86;

247-93; 295-327) (motion and arguments to vacate sentence).
court, however, denied his motion and this appeal followed.
4

The

(R 206-10; 320-27).

Procedural facts other those summarized

above are addressed in the court's ruling or in the "Argument"
section of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The court's order denying Mr. Leyva's motion to vacate
sentence included the following "Findings of Fact" and
"Conclusions of Law":
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On July 27, 19 [892] , defendant was convicted
of three counts of Distribution of a Controlled
Substance. Each was a second degree felony.
2. Following the verdict, this Court set a
sentencing date. That date was continued several times
either at the request of defendant's trial counsel,
Loni Deland, or because defendant did not appear at the
date set. Eventually, the sentencing date was set for
January 16, 1990.
3. Sometime after the jury verdict defendant
voluntarily left Utah and went to California. While
there, defendant was arrested on other charges and
incarcerated.
4. On January 16, 1990, the defendant did not
appear. This Court was informed that defendant did not
appear because he was incarcerated on other charges in
California. This Court continued sentencing without
date pending defendant's return.
5. The State initially did not file a detainer
with California correction authorities.
6. Defendant filed a 180 day disposition notice.
No action was taken on the 180 day notice because the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office determined the Utah
Code Annotated Sec. 77-29-1 did not apply to cases that
had already been tried and were only awaiting
sentencing.
2

The court mistakenly listed a date of July 27, 1990,
which appears to be a typographical error. The correct date
should be July 27, 1989. See (R 55, 79, 103-05).
5

7. Although Loni Deland, was still defendant's
attorney throughout the period that defendant was
incarcerated out of state, defendant did not ask Deland
to file, and Deland did not file, any motions
challenging the delay in his sentencing.
8. After defendant served his time in California,
the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) obtained custody and held defendant
because of problems with his status in the United
States. Because there was no treaty which allowed his
deportation back to Cuba defendant was eventually
transferred to Colorado. Early in 1994, INS released
defendant and he was promptly returned to Utah to be
sentenced.
9. On March 4, 1994, defendant was present
before this Court and was sentenced. At the
sentencing, defendant did not make any objection to
this Court about the delay in his sentencing or this
Court's jurisdiction to sentence.
10. Defendant has not shown any specific
prejudice that resulted from the delay in his sentence.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Defendant was absent from his sentencing in
January 1990 because he was incarcerated in California.
However, Defendant voluntarily left Utah pending his
sentencing. He voluntarily traveled to California. He
committed new criminal acts in California. His arrest
and incarceration in California were a consequence of
his voluntary acts. Therefore, Defendant's failure to
appear for sentencing in Utah was voluntary.
2. This Court is not convinced that a criminal
defendant has the right to a speedy sentencing.
However, if such a right exists the four factors
articulated for considering a violation for the right
to speedy trial apply. These factors are, the length
of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the
defendant. However, defendant has failed to make a
sufficient showing that these factors warrant a finding
of denial of any right defendant may have to a speedy
sentencing. Although the delay between the verdict and
the sentence was considerable, it was caused by
defendant's failure to appear for sentencing or else
his counsel's request for continuances and then by
defendant leaving Utah and committing other criminal
offenses in California. Defendant did not assert any
6

right to a speedy sentencing.
Defendant was not
prejudiced by any delay in his sentencing.
3. Defendant's request for disposition of untried
case within 180 days as provided by UCA 77-29-1 was not
an assertion of defendant's right to speedy sentencing.
4. The case of In Re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P.
532 (Utah 1903) is distinguishable from the facts in
this case and is not controlling.
5. Defendant cannot divest this Court of
jurisdiction to sentence him by voluntarily absenting
himself from the jurisdiction of this Court prior to
imposition of sentence.
(R 206-10) (emphasis added) (attached as Addendum B ) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Jurisdiction was lost in the case at bar when the trial
court "continued without date" sentencing proceedings which were
needed to finalize Mr. Leyva's case.

The State was aware that

Rogelio Leyva was imprisoned in another jurisdiction, but it did
nothing to ensure Mr. Leyva 7 s return to Utah.

The State did not

attempt to extradite him, nor did it file an appropriate
detainer.

Moreover, despite Mr. Leyva's request to have his case

disposed of, the State expressly refused to take action.

The

indefinite and open-ended nature of the court's order, together
with the State's inaction in a matter which extended over four
years, left in "limbo" Mr. Leyva's sentencing proceeding.

The

court should have vacated the sentence which was finally imposed.

7

ARGUMENT
THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER MR. LEYVA BECAUSE
OF ITS ORDER INDEFINITELY SUSPENDING SENTENCE AND
THE STATE'S INACTION IN THE MATTER
Contrary to the position held by the trial court, the longstanding principles of In re Flint,

25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531

(1903), govern the case at bar:
there are many exigencies that could arise which might,
in the interests of justice, require a postponement of
the time for sentence beyond that first fixed by the
court. In such cases the court may, in order to protect
the interests of the state, and give the defendant ample
time and opportunity to avail himself of every safeguard
guaranteed him by law, suspend sentence from one
designated time to another. But we know of no rule or
principle of law whereby a court can indefinitely
suspend sentence, keep the defendant in a state of
suspense and uncertainty, and, long after he has been
discharged from custody, have him rearrested, and impose
a sentence of either fine or imprisonment of him. A
suspension of sentence for an indefinite period is, in
effect, an exercise of the functions of the pardoning
power, which belongs exclusively to the board of
pardons, - - a separate and distinct department of the
state government, and in no way connected with the trial
courts.
Id. at 531-32 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 3
On January 16, 1990, the trial court indefinitely suspended
Mr. Leyva's sentence by ruling, "The sentencing is continued
without date."
Addendum C ) .

(R 125) (emphasis added) (attached as

Although at the time Mr. Leyva was incarcerated in

California on other charges, (R 125, 207), the Utah sentence
still should not have been continued indefinitely.
3

The statutes in Flint
mirror existing authority albeit
some minor revisions have since been made. See, e.g., Utah R.
Crim. P. 22; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.
8

His three Utah convictions, all dated July 27, 1989, (R 10305), required the accompanying imposition of sentence regardless
of his status in another jurisdiction.

Cf.

State

v. Green,

757

P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988) (a defendant faced with a sentence must
not "be left in a perpetual state of limbo . . . [or] subject to
a continued term of fictional supervision").

To continue

sentencing without a fixed date creates "absurd results".

Id.

The present case illustrates why an indefinite sentencing date is
improper.
Where, as here, the court fails to impose sentence during
the trial proceedings, the defendant is deprived of his
constitutional right to an appeal.
§ 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(g).

(R 317); Utah Const, art. I,
A judgment in a criminal

matter that fails to impose sentence does not resolve the
proceedings between the parties, and "[i]t is the sentence itself
which constitutes a final judgment from which appellant has the
right to appeal."
1978); see also

State

State

v. Gerrard,

in Interest

584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah

of T.D.C.,

748 P.2d 201, 202

(Utah App. 1988) (A final judgment is one that ends the
proceedings between the parties, "leaving no question open for
further judicial action").

Although an appeal could have been

filed after Mr. Leyva was sentenced, since the sentence itself
was suspended indefinitely the accompanying right to an appeal
was similarly sacrificed.
Hence, the court's order of January 16, 1990, (R 125), which
was continued without date not only left Mr. Leyva in "limbo" for
9

purposes of sentencing, the indefinite order left Rogelio
powerless to challenge the conviction itself.
v.

Tuttle,

(R 317); cf.

State

713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985) (a prisoner who escapes from

custody does not forfeit his right to appeal because the escape
may be punished through other means).
"Absurd results" are further reflected by what almost
happened under the court's indefinite sentencing order.

Although

immigration authorities ("INS") never filed charges against
Mr. Leyva, the INS still imprisoned Rogelio and retained custody
and control over him even after he had served his time in San
Bernadino, California.

(R 209; 238-40; 272-78) (Rogelio was also

imprisoned in Chino, California; Shakawala, Arizona; Susanville,
California; Donovan, California; Chula Vista, California; El
Centro, California; Limestone County, Texas; Terra Haute,
Indiana; Tucson, Arizona; and Inglewood, Colorado.).
Moreover, because of the open-ended nature of the court's
order, (R 125), sentencing in Utah for the 1989 convictions would
have been "continued" forever if the INS had simply decided to
deport Rogelio or if his federal imprisonment had ended with INS
"releas[ing] him to the streets without any form of conditions of
probation."

(R 239-40) (the federal government considered such

an unconditional release as well as deportation proceedings).
Even if an indefinite suspension had not occurred, the
court's order allowed many years or even decades to pass before a
sentence could be imposed for the July 27, 1989, convictions (and
his concomitant right to appeal).
10

Having done little to secure

Mr. Leyva after his time in California, sentencing proceedings in
Utah would be triggered only by the off-chance that law
enforcement agencies became aware of Mr. Leyva's return to
Utah.4
According to the court below, when Rogelio was in
California, "The State initially did not file a detainer with
California correction authorities."

(R 207) {Finding of Fact

No. 5 ) . The State claimed that "detainers on sentencings are not
appropriate . . . ," (R 264), but case law suggests otherwise.
For example, in Hearn

v.

State,

642 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982), the

state of Utah filed a detainer on three separate occasions and in
two of the instances, the detainers involved sentencing
proceedings.
Appellant Hearn was serving a sentence in Washington State
Penitentiary when the state of Utah filed a detainer there to
bring him back to "face charges of armed robbery in this state."
Id.

at 758.

Following Hearn 7 s trial and conviction in Utah, he

was imprisoned briefly here before Utah realized that they had to
return him to Washington.
Now cognizant "of their obligations under the Agreement [the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers], Utah returned appellant to
4

The effect of the court's bench warrant here is similar to
the ineffectiveness of the bench warrant issued in State
v. Moya,
815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1991). In Moya, the defendant "argue[d]
that the court lost jurisdiction when it effectively suspended his
incarceration indefinitely by withdrawing the nationwide arrest
warrant and substituting a domestic warrant.
Defendant [Moya]
claim [ed] he was free from incarceration as long as he remained
outside Utah, or while in Utah, avoided arrest." 815 P.2d at 1315
n.4. The issue there, however, was not decided.
Id.
11

Washington State, subiect to a detainer to return him to complete
his Utah sentence after he had completed his sentence there."
Id.

at 758 (emphasis added).

Thereafter, while Hearn still was

imprisoned, he was convicted in federal court and moved to a
federal prison.

Having apparently been overlooked during the

federal transfer, Utah again filed another detainer with the
federal institution to ensure that Hearn would finish his Utah
sentence.
In short, detainers on sentencings are appropriate.

The

failure of the prosecution in the case at bar to file or send one
is an omission critical to distinguishing other cases where a
detainer was in fact filed.

See, e.g.,

P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993); State
(Utah 1974).

v.

Crosland

Saxton,

v.

State,

857

519 P.2d 1340, 1341

The prosecution here omitted or neglected this key-

step despite authority allowing it to do so.

See Utah Code Ann.

§§ 77-28-2; 77-28a-2; 77-29-7.
Since the Board of Pardons and Parole has no jurisdiction
over matters which have not been sentenced, the onus is on the
prosecution to ensure his return to Utah.
Bd of

Pardons,

Cf.

Ontiveros

v.

Case No. 940290-CA (Utah App. June 15, 1995)

Utah
("the

Utah Board of Pardons issued a warrant of detainer to California"
to ensure appellant Ontiveros' return to and completion of his
Utah sentence after serving time in a California prison); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-7 ("All courts, departments, agencies, officers
and employees of this state and its political subdivisions are
hereby directed to enforce the agreement on detainers and to
12

cooperate with one another and with other party states in
enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose").

Utah

authorities, however, did nothing to provide for Rogelio Leyva's
return during his January 16, 1990, sentencing proceeding, and
the prosecution expressly refused to honor Mr. Leyva's
subsequently filed 180 day disposition notice.

(R 207-08; 264).

The court acknowledged that while Rogelio had filed a 180
day disposition notice on or about May or June of 1991, (R 207;
251-52, 273), "[n]o action was taken on the 180 day notice
because the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office determined that
the Utah Code Annotated Sec. 77-29-1 did not apply to cases that
had already been tried and were only awaiting sentencing."
(R 208) (Finding of Fact No. 6 ) ; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1
(the statute does refer to "untried" matters,5 but regardless of
its applicability, the State effectively waived further
proceedings by failing to file a detainer pursuant to the
Interstate Agreement on Detainer, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5).
The State determination that section 77-29-1 did not apply

5

The provision relating to the 180 day disposition, section
77-29-1, states in pertinent part:
Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in
the state prison . . . of this state, and there is pending
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment
or information, and the prisoner shall deliver . . . a
written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the
court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the
charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of
delivery of written notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1).
13

is actually of little import here.

The more critical step was

for the State to have first filed a detainer:
[The Interstate Agreement on Detainers] enumerat[es]
certain procedures through which prisoners can demand
disposition of pending charges in another jurisdiction
and by allowing member states to obtain prisoners being
held by other member states. These procedures begin
only after "a 'detainer' is filed with the custodial
(sending) State by another State (receiving) having
untried charges pending against the prisoner; to obtain
temporary custody, the receiving State must also file an
appropriate 'request' with the sending State. Custodial
officials must then notify the prisoner of the detainer.
Crosland

v. State,

857 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added

and citations omitted).
With the applicability of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers seemingly linked to "any untried indictment,
information or complaint", see
III, paragraph (a); see

also

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (Article

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1), authority

defining the full extent and meaning of being "tried" lends
appropriate guidance.
"'[T]he sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment,' by implication including the whole trial
process within the ambit of the speedy trial right."
Banks,
States,

720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1986) (quoting Pollard
352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957)).

State

v.

v.

United

"[W]e conclude that the right

to a speedy trial may encompass the time during which a matter is
under consideration.

A speedy trial necessarily contemplates not

only a seasonal trial of the facts, but also a seasonal decision
and sentencing following trial."

Banks,

720 P.2d at 1385.

Mr. Leyva's case may have been partially tried upon the
14

rendering of the jury's verdict, (R 103-05), but absent the
sentencing proceedings his case remained

easonally untried.

(R 125). A proceeding without the imposition of sentence would
constitute an unfinished or incomplete "trial".
If the prosecution is unwilling to secure Mr. Leyva's
requested

return to Utah for sentencing and such proceedings are

continued without date, the court's jurisdiction must end.
Indefinite suspensions of sentence are precisely what In re

Flint

sought to avoid.
Similarly, the court must retain control over the case until
the entire matter is disposed of.
After conviction the trial court may undoubtedly suspend
judgment temporarily for stated periods, from time to
time. It may be proper to do so to allow the defendant
time to move for a new trial, to perfect an appeal, to
present a petition for pardon, and to allow the court
time to consider and determine the sentence to be
imposed. But when a defendant stands convicted, and all
the remedies provided by law for testing the correctness
of the conviction have been exhausted or waived,[6] we
have no doubt it is the duty of the court to keep
control of the case, and within a reasonable time to
proceed to give judgment, and, in doing so, to exercise
such discretion as the statute governing the particular
offense commits to the courts.
In re Flint,

71 P. at 532 (footnote and emphasis added).

The court and the prosecution here both relinquished control
over Rogelio Leyva's case for sentencing purposes.

The state of

Utah's jurisdiction over him had ended.
Mr. Leyva does not ignore the court's conclusion that his
6

As stated above, the remedy or right of appeal in the
case at bar was foreclosed by the court's indefinite continuation
of a sentencing date. (R 125).
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initial "failure to appear for sentencing in Utah was voluntary"
because of his arrest and incarceration in California.

(R 208-

09).

This "voluntary" determination, however, is incorrect.

State

v.

Houtz,

See

714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).

In Houtz,

the lower "court determined that defendant had

voluntarily chosen to absent himself from the trial because he
had left Utah in violation of his bail."

714 P.2d 677.

On

appeal, however, the supreme court disagreed with the trial
court's conclusion.

Despite Houtz's bail violation and his

arrest for drunk driving in San Diego, California, "[w]hen a
defendant is in custody, he is not free to make a voluntary
decision about whether or not he will attend the court
proceedings.

Taken into custody on February 25, 1985, in San

Diego, defendant cannot be considered to have 'voluntarily'
refused to appear [in Utah] on February 26 or 27, 1985."

Id.

(citations omitted).
The situation here is no different.

Mr. Leyva "was absent

from his sentencing in January 1990 because he was incarcerated
in California."

(R 208) (Conclusion of Law No. 1 ) . Despite his

bail violation and subsequent arrest in San Bernadino,
California, since Rogelio was in custody there he "cannot be
considered to have 'voluntarily' refused to appear [in Utah on
January 16, 1990]."

See Houtz,

714 P.2d 677.

Further, assuming, arguendo,
in sentencing, see also

supra

blame lies for an initial delay

note 1, a temporary postponement of

a few months does not nullify a subsequent court order which
16

indefinitely suspended sentencing.
Velasquez,

(R 125); compare

State

v.

641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982) (temporary delays

attributable to defendant merely extend or toll [as opposed to
eliminate] the time-line applicable to a disposition period),
with

supra

note

1 (the delays attributable here, including one

caused by a snowstorm, would at most amount to approximately four
and one-half months--a period of no consequence to a court order
indefinitely suspending sentencing).
As alluded to above, the right to a speedy trial does
include "a seasonal decision and sentencing following trial."
State

v.

Banks,

720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1986).

In addressing

the four factors [(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for
the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4)
the prejudice to the defendant], the court here simply contended:
Although the delay between the verdict and the sentence
was considerable, it was caused by defendant's failure
to appear for sentencing or else his counsel's request
for continuances and then by defendant leaving Utah and
committing other criminal offenses in California.
Defendant did not assert any right to a speedy
sentencing. Defendant was not prejudiced by any delay
in his sentencing.
(R 2 09).

However, based upon the discussion herein, the four

factors reflect the unreasonable nature of the sentence.
Like the eighteen-month delay between the completion of the
trial and the decision finally rendered in Banks,

see

720 P.2d at

1383 (the judge died after the facts were presented but before a
decision was issued), the delay here between Mr. Leyva's July 27,
1989, conviction and the March 4, 1994, sentence "is sufficient
17

to raise legitimate questions regarding defendant's right to a
speedy disposition of his case."

Id.

at 1385-86.

The second factor, the reason for the delay, is due to the
State's inaction in pursuing extradition proceedings or in not
filing a detainer with California and federal authorities.

Even

if immediately custody and sentencing in Utah was not possible, a
detainer would have asked California authorities to hold him for
Utah law enforcement or at least it would have allowed Utah to
receive notice of his imminent release.

See Carchman

v.

Nash,

473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985).
Had the State filed an appropriate detainer, Mr. Leyva may
have been returned to Utah following his period of incarceration
in the San Bernadino prison and his needless imprisonment in
federal prisons could have been avoided.

Instead, the INS

continued to hold and transfer him to numerous institutions
without ever filing charges.

(R 209; 238-40; 272-78).

Other

than contemplating deportation, the INS did not know what to do
with him and no entity (i.e. Utah) had expressed or properly
conveyed any interest in him (i.e. vis-a-vis a detainer).
The court's conclusion that "Defendant cannot divest this
Court of jurisdiction to sentence him by voluntarily absenting
himself from the jurisdiction of this Court prior to imposition
of sentence" is appropriate only for the initial time period
required for sentencing.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("Upon the

. . . verdict of guilty . . . the court shall set a time for
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than
18

45 days after the verdict . . . unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders").
Following Mr. Leyva's assent to a few continuances and even
assuming, arguendo,
see

supra

that initial delays were his responsibility,

note 1, whatever happened prior to January 16, 1990,

was nothing more than a temporary delay.

The court's order

continuing sentencing without date was an indefinite suspension
of the proceedings.

(R 125); In re Flint,

25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531

(1903) ,
Rogelio Leyva asserted his right to sentencing, thereby
satisfying the third factor, when he filed the 180 day
disposition notice which the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
chose to ignore.

The State's failure to file a timely detainer

is an omission which makes unforgiving and irreparable the
court's indefinite sentencing order.
P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 1993); see

also

See Crosland

v.

State,

857

(R 276-79) (Mr. Leyva

contacted prior defense counsel to seek relief from his continued
incarceration by the INS).
The final factor, prejudice, is met by the holding and
principles of In re Flint,

a case which granted petitioner

Flint's writ of habeas corpus in order to discharge him from a
sentence rendered by a court which had no jurisdiction.
531-32.

71 P. at

More personal to Mr. Leyva, however, is the prejudicial

and needless years of imprisonment he served in federal
institutions.

(R 238-40; 272-78).

If a court order continuing

sentencing without date was not on its face prejudicial, the
19

State's inaction and refusal to timely file an appropriate
detainer resulted unnecessarily in over four years of
incarceration.
Jurisdiction was lost and the "sentencing" proceeding of
March 4, 1994, was a nullity.

(R 242) (three indeterminate terms

of one-to-fifteen years were imposed concurrently and then
immediately stayed for 3 6 months probation in light of the period
of incarceration already served by Rogelio in other
penitentiaries while he awaited "sentencing" in Utah); see
State

v.

Babbel,

also

813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991) ("because an unlawful

sentence was void, it created no rights and neither impaired nor
affected any right").

The court erred in denying Mr. Leyva's

motion to vacate sentence.

(R 206-10). 7

7

Since the motion to vacate the court's sentence of
probation, dated March 4, 1994, (R 241-44), should have been
granted, (R 206-10), a probation violation could not have
occurred and the order to show cause proceeding was superfluous.
(R 141-59) . The alleged violation was dealt with independently.
(R 194, 204).
20

CONCLUSION
Mr. Leyva respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
lower court's denial of his motion to vacate sentence.
in
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ADDENDUM A

Sec 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
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statutory provisions, § 77-1-6.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
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counsel for his defence.

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the
time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995.)

+^M~t±*
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76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Definitions — Civil penalties — Restitution —
Hearing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes
with mandatory sentences — Resentencing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and mcludes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation.
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1)
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77-27-30. Violation by parolee or probationer supervised
in another state — Hearing in other state —
Procedure upon receipt of record from other
state.
In any case of alleged parole or probation violation by a person being
supervised in another state pursuant to the interstate compact for the
supervision of parolees and probationers, any appropriate judicial or administrative officer or agency in another state is authorized to hold a hearing on
the alleged violation. Upon receipt of the record of a parole or probation
violation hearing held in another state pursuant to a statute substantially
similar to this act, the record shall have the same standing and effect as
though the proceeding of which it is a record was had before the appropriate
officer or officers in this state, and any recommendations contained in or
accompanying the record shall be fully considered by the appropriate officer or
officers of this state in making disposition of the matter.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-30, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-27-31.

Short title.

Sections 77-27-24 through 77-27-30 of this chapter may be cited as the
"Uniform Act for Out-of-State Supervision."
History: C. 1953, 77-27-31, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, 9 2.

CHAPTER 28
WESTERN INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS
COMPACT
Section
77-28-1.
77-28-2.
77-28-3.

77-28-1.

Section
Compact enacted into law — Text
of compact.
Department of Corrections — Authority to transfer inmates.
Duties and powers of courts, departments, agencies and officers

77-28-4.
77-28-5.

in enforcing and effecting compact.
Board of Pardons and Parole —
Authority to hold hearings.
Governor — Power to enter into
contracts.

Compact enacted into law — Text of compact.

The Western Interstate Corrections Compact as contained herein is enacted
into law and entered into on behalf of this state with any and all other states
legally joining therein in a form substantially as follows:
ARTICLE I
PURPOSE AND POLICY
The party states, desiring by common action to improve their institutional
facilities and provide programs of sufficiently high quality for the confinement,
740
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treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the
policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a
basis of cooperation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of
such offenders and of society. The purpose of this compact is to provide for the
development and execution of such programs of cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders.
ARTICLE II
DEFINITIONS
As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
(a) "State" means a state of the United States or, subject to the
limitation contained in Article VII, Guam.
(b) "Sending state" means a state party to this compact in which
conviction was had.
(c) "Receiving state" means a state party to this compact to which an
inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction was
had.
(d) "Inmate" means a male or female offender who is under sentence to
or confined in a prison or other correctional institution.
(e) "Institution" means any prison, reformatory or other correctional
facility (including but not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or
mentally defective) in which inmates may lawfully be confined.
ARTICLE III
CONTRACTS
(a) Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more
of the other party states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending
state in institutions situated within receiving states. Any such contract shall
provide for:
(1) Its duration.
(2) Payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending state for
inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental expenses, and any
participation in or receipt by inmates of rehabilitative or correctional
services, facilities, programs or treatment not reasonably included as part
of normal maintenance.
(3) Participation in programs of inmate employment, if any; the disposition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on account thereof;
and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting
therefrom.
(4) Delivery and retaking of inmates.
(5) Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the
obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and receiving states.
(b) Prior to the construction or completion of construction of any institution
or addition thereto by a party state, any other party state or states may
contract therewith for the enlargement of the planned capacity of the institution or addition thereto, or for the inclusion therein of particular equipment or
structures, and for the reservation of a specific percentum of the capacity of the
institution to be kept available for use by inmates of the sending state or states
741
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so contracting. Any sending state so contracting may, to the extent that monies
are legally available therefor, pay to the receiving state, a reasonable sum as
consideration for such enlargement of capacity, or provision of equipment or
structures, and reservation of capacity. Such payment may be in a lump sum
or in installments as provided in the contract.
(c) The terms and provisions of this compact shall be a part of any contract
entered into by the authority of or pursuant thereto, and nothing in any such
contract shall be inconsistent therewith.

appropriate authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving state if
authorized by the sending state. The receiving state shall provide adequate
facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of
a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials
of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and
a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be
made. Said record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials
shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the
hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In any
and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, the
officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and
no final determination shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate
officials of the sending state. Costs of records made pursuant to this subdivision shall be borne by the sending state.
(g) Any inmate confined pursuant to this compact shall be released within
the territory of the sending state unless the inmate, and the sending and
receiving states, shall agree upon release in some other place. The sending
state shall bear the cost of such return to its territory.
(h) Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this compact shall have
any and all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be
relieved of any obligations or have such obligations modified or his status
changed on account of any action or proceeding in which he could have
participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state
located within such state.
(i) The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons entitled under
the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or otherwise function with
respect to any inmate shall not be deprived of or restricted in his exercise of
any powers in respect of any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this
compact.

77-28-1

ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURE AND RIGHTS
(a) Whenever the duly constituted judicial or administrative authorities in
a state party to this compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant
to Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an
institution within the territory of another party state is necessary in order to
provide adequate quarters and care or desirable in order to provide an
appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may direct
that the confinement be within an institution within the territory of said other
party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the
sending state.
(b) The appropriate officials of any state party to this compact shall have
access, at all reasonable times, to any institutions in which it has a contractual
right to confine inmates for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and
visiting such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution.
(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this compact
shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at
any time be removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or other institution
within the sending state, for transfer to another institution in which the
sending state may have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for
release on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose
permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided that the sending state
shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be required pursuant
to the terms of any contract entered into under the terms of Article III.
(d) Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each sending state
on the inmates of that sending state in institutions pursuant to this compact
including a conduct record of each inmate and certify said record to the official
designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have the
benefit of his or her record in determining and altering the disposition of said
inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state and
in order that the same may be a source of information for the sending state.
(e) All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to the
provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane
manner and shall be cared for and treated equally with such similar inmates
of the receiving state as may be confined in the same institution. The fact of
confinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of
any legal rights which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of the Bending state.
(f) Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined pursuant to this
compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending state may be had before the
742
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ARTICLE V
ACTS NOT REVIEWABLE IN RECEIVING STATE — EXTRADITION
(a) Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it
retains jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall be conclusive upon and not
reviewable within the receiving state, but if at any time the sending state
seeks to remove an inmate from an institution in the receiving state there is
pending against the inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the
inmate is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense,
the inmate shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state
until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment
or detention for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state
shall be permitted to transport inmates pursuant to this compact through any
and all states party to this compact without interference.
(b) An inmate who escapes from an institution in which he is confined
pursuant to this compact shall be deemed a fugitive from the sending state and
from the state in which the institution is situated. In the case of an escape to
a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for
institution of extradition proceedings shall be that of the sending state, but
nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or affect the activities
743
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of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension
and return of an escapee.
ARTICLE VI
FEDERAL AID
Any state party to this compact may accept federal aid for use in connection
with any institution or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this
compact or any contract pursuant hereto and any inmate in a receiving state
pursuant to this compact may participate in any such federally aided program
or activity for which the sending and receiving states have made contractual
provision provided that if such program or activity is not part of the customary
correctional regimen the express consent of the appropriate official of the
sending state shall be required therefor.
ARTICLE VII
ENTRY INTO FORCE
This compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding upon
the states so acting when it has been enacted into law by any two contiguous
states from among the states of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington
and Wyoming. For the purposes of this article, Alaska and Hawaii shall be
deemed contiguous to each other; to any and all of the states of California,
Oregon and Washington; and to Guam. Thereafter, this compact shall enter
into force and become effective and binding as to any other of said states, or
any other state contiguous to at least one party state upon similar action by
such state. Guam may become party to this compact by taking action similar
to that provided for joinder by any other eligible party state and upon the
consent of congress to such joinder. For the purpose of this article, Guam shall
be deemed contiguous to Alaska, Hawaii, California, Oregon and Washington.
ARTICLE VIII
WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION
This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a party state
until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the same and providing for the
sending of formal written notice of withdrawal from the compact to the
appropriate officials of all other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not
take effect until two years after the notices provided in said statute have been
sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from its
obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal.
Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its
territory, at its own expense, such inmates as it may have confined pursuant to
the provisions of this compact.
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non-party state for the confinement, rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nci
to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of cooperative
institutional arrangements,
AETICLE X
CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY
The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed and shall be
severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is
declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the
United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or
circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance
shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the
constitution of any state participating therein, the compact shall remain in full
force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the
state affected as to all severable matters.
History* C. 1953, 77-28-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Agreement on Detainers, § 77-29-5 et seq., to
Utah officials for temporary custody of prisoner
Constitutionality
to t
h i m o n k } d n a p p i n g a n d r a p e charges
Change in custody of prisoner received,
^ ^
m California> U t a h officials d i d n o t
•jurisdiction.
h a v e a u t h o r i t y u n d e r t h e Western Interstate
Constitutionality.
Corrections Compact or the Interstate AgreeCompact did not operate unconstitutionally ment on Detainers to transfer custody of prisas an ex post facto law that imposed other oner to California without the direction or apconditions on plaintiff than were included in his proval of the Oregon authorities; California
1958 conviction for robbery, where, pursuant to could obtain such approval by making its rethe compact, plaintiff was transferred to an- quest directly to Oregon or by having its reother state after a 1962 conviction for malicious quest forwarded by Utah officials to Oregon
assault on a fellow inmate. Ringo v. Turner, 16 authorities. Gibson v. Morris, 646 P.2d 733
Utah 2d 298, 400 P.2d 15 (1965).
(Utah 1982).
The transfer and incarceration of prisoners
pursuant to compact was constitutional
Jurisdiction.
Crawford v. Smith, 578 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1978),
Arizona prisoner who was transferred to a
Utah prison upon his request to be near his sick
Change in custody of prisoner received.
mother remained subject to Arizona jurisdicWhere prisoner was convicted and sentenced tion with respect to the question of where he
by an Oregon court and was transferred to should be housed, and Utah courts had no
Utah for confinement in the Utah State Prison jurisdiction to rule on his request to return to
under the Western Interstate Corrections Com- Arizona if that state chose to retain him in
pact and, while in confinement in Utah, Cali- Utah facilities. Ellis v. Deland, 786 P,2d 231
fornia made a request under the Interstate (Utah 1990).

77-28-1,

Department of Corrections — Authority to transfer inmates.

ARTICLE DC
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAFFECTED
Nothing contained in this compact shall be construed to abrogate or impair
any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a

The E^epartment of Corrections may transfer an inmate (as defined in Article
11(d) of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact) to any institution within
or without this state if this state has entered into a contract or contracts for the
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confinement of inmates in said institutions pursuant to Article III of the
Western Interstate Corrections Compact.
History: C. 1953, 77-28-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 212, 9 25.

Section
77-28a-5.

Governor — Power to enter into
contracts.

77-28a-l.
77-28-3. Duties and powers of courts, departments, agencies and officers in enforcing and effecting compact.
The courts, departments, agencies and officers of this state and its subdivisions shall enforce this compact and shall do all things appropriate to the
effectuation of its purposes and intent which may be within their respective
i unsanctions including but not limited to the making and submission of such
reports as are required by the compact.

77-28-4. Board of Pardons and Parole — Authority to hold
hearings.
The Board of Pardons and Parole is hereby authorized and directed to hold
uch hearings as may be requested by any other party state pursuant to Article
V(f) of the Western Interstate Corrections Compact. The board is further
•uthorized to travel to any state who is a party to the compact to which an
nmate is sent for confinement, for the purpose of holding any hearing to which
n inmate is entitled by the laws of Utah.
History: C. 1953, 77-28-4, enacted by L.
980, ch. 15, § 2; 1994, ch. 13, 9 43.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend>ent, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "The

Board of Pardons and Parole" for "The state
Board of Pardons" at the beginning of the
section and deleted "the State of" before "Utah"
at the end of the section.

Governor — Power to enter into contracts.

The governor is empowered to enter into such contracts on behalf of this
ate as may be appropriate to implement the participation of this state in the
Astern Interstate Corrections Compact pursuant to Article III thereof.
History: C. 1983, 77-28-5, enacted by L.
>80, ch. 15, S 2; 1983, ch. 320, 9 91.

CHAPTER 28a
tNTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT
'tion
28a-l.
28a-2.
28a-3.

Section
Compact entered into law — Text
of compact.
Department of Corrections — Authority to transfer inmates.
Duties and powers of courts, de-

Compact entered into law — Text of compact.

The interstate compact on corrections as contained herein is enacted into
law and entered into on behalf of this state with any and all other states legally
joining therein in a form substantially as follows:
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT
ARTICLE I
PURPOSE AND POLICY

History: C. 1953, 77-28-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

7-28-5.

77-28a-l

77-28a-4.

partments, agencies and officers
in enforcing and effecting compact.
Board of Pardons and Parole —
Authority
Authority to
t/> hold
hn\Ahearings.
ti»^«-

The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve
their institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that
it is the policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and
programs on a basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best
interests of such offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital
expenditures and operational costs. The purpose of this Compact is to provide
for the mutual development and execution of such programs of co-operation for
the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most
economical use of human and material resources.
ARTICLE II
DEFINITIONS
As used in this Compact, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
(a) "State" means a state of the United States, the United States of
America, a Territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
(b) "Sending state" means a state party to this Compact in which
conviction or court commitment was had;
(c) "Receiving state" means a state party to this Compact to which an
inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which conviction or
court commitment was had;
(d) "Inmate" means a male or female offender who is committed, under
sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional institution;
(e) "Institution" means any penal or correctional facility, including but
not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or mentally defective, in which
inmates as defined in (d) above may lawfully be confined.
ARTICLE III
CONTRACTS
(a) Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more
of the other party states for the confinement of inmates on behalf of a sending
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state in institutions situated within receiving states. Anv su-?h contract *ha
provide for:
(1) Its duration;
(2) Payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending state for
inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental expenses, and any
participation in or receipt by inmates of rehabilitative or correctional
services, facilities, programs or treatment not reasonably included as part
of normal maintenance;
(3) Participation in programs of inmate employment, if any, the disposition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on account thereof,
and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting
therefrom;
(4) Delivery and retaking of inmates;
(5) Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the
obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and receiving states.
(b) The terms and provisions of this Compact shall be a part of any contract
entered into by the authority of or pursuant thereto, and nothing in any such
contract shall be inconsistent therewith.

(e) All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant to thr
provisions of this Compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane
manner and shall be treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving
state as may be confined in the same institution. The fact of confinement in a
receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights
which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of
the sending state.
(f) Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined pursuant to this
Compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending state may be had before
the appropriate authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving state, if
authorized by the sending state. The receiving state shall provide adequate
facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of
a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials
of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and
a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be
made. Said record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials
shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the
hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In any
and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision, the
officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and
no final determination shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate
officials of the sending state.
(g) Any inmate confined pursuant to this Compact shall be released within
the territory of the sending state unless the inmate, and the sending and
receiving states, shall agree upon release in some other place. The sending
state shall bear the cost of such return to its territory.
(h) Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this Compact shall have
any and all rights to participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be
relieved of any obligations or have such obligations modified or his status
changed on account of any action or proceeding in which he could have
participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state
located within such state.
(i) The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons entitled under
the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or otherwise function with
respect to any inmate shall not be deprived of or restricted in his exercise of
any powers in respect of any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this
Compact.

ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURES AND RIGHTS
(a) Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party to this
Compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to Article III, shall
decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within
the territory of another party state is necessary or desirable in order to provide
adequate quarters and care of an appropriate program of rehabilitation or
treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within an
institution with the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act
in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.
(b) The appropriate officials of any state party to this Compact shall have
access, at all reasonable times, to any institution in which it has a contractual
right to confine inmates for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and
visiting such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution.
(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this Compact
shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at
any time be removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or other institution
within the sending state, for transfer to another institution in which the
sending state may have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for
release on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose
permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided, that the sending state
shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be required pursuant
to the terms of any contract entered into under the terms of Article III.
(d) Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each sending state
on the inmates of that sending state in institutions pursuant to this Compact
including a conduct record of each inmate and certify said record to the official
designated by the sending state, in order that each inmate may have official
review of his or her record in determining and altering the disposition of said
inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state and
in order that the same may be a source of information for the sending state.
748

ARTICLE V
ACTS NOT REVIEWABLE IN RECEIVING STATE: EXTRADITION
(a) Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it
retains jurisdiction pursuant to this Compact shall be conclusive upon and not
reviewable within the receiving state, but if at the time the sending state seeks
to remove an inmate from an institution in the receiving state there is pending
against the inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the inmate is
formally accused of having committed within such state a criminal offense, the
inmate shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until
discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment or
detention for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state
749
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shall be permitted to transport inmates pursuant to this Compact through any
and all states party to this Compact without interference.
(b) An inmate who escapes from an institution in which he is confined
pursuant to this Compact shall be deemed a fugitive from the sending state
andfromthe state in which the institution is situated. In the case of an escape
to a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for
institution of extradition or rendition proceedings shall be that of the sending
state, but nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or affect the
activities of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the
apprehension and return of an escapee.

non-party state for the confinement, rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nor
to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of co-operative
institutional arrangements.

ARTICLE VI
FEDERAL AID
Any state party to this Compact may accept federal aid for use in connection
with any institution or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this
Compact or any contract pursuant hereto and any inmate in a receiving state
pursuant to this Compact may participate in any such federally aided program
or activity for which the sending and receiving states have made contractual
provision; provided, that if such program or activity is not part of the
customary correctional regimen the express consent of the appropriate official
of the sending state shall be required therefor.
ARTICLE VII
ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding upon
the states so acting when it has been enacted into law by any two states.
Thereafter, this Compact shall enter into force and become effective and
binding as to any other of said states upon similar action by such state.
ARTICLE VIII
WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION
This Compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a party state
until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the same and providing for the
sending of formal written notice of withdrawal from the Compact to the
appropriate officials of all other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not
take effect until one year after the notices provided in said statute have been
sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from its
obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal.
Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its
territory, at its own expense, such inmates as it may have confined pursuant to
the provisions of this Compact.
ARTICLE DC
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAFFECTED
Nothing contained in this Compact shall be construed to abrogate or impair
any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a
750
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ARTICLE X
CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY
The provisions of this Compact shall be liberally construed and shall be
severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this Compact is
declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the
United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or
circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Compact and
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance
shall not be affected thereby. If this Compact shall be held contrary to the
constitution of any state participating therein, the Compact shall remain in
full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to
the state affected as to all severable matters.
ARTICLE XI
An inmate must request a transfer in writing before such a transfer can be
made pursuant to Article IV.
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-l, enacted by L.
1982, ch. 38, S 1.

77-28a-2. Department of Corrections — Authority to
transfer inmates.
The Department of Corrections may transfer an inmate, as denned in
Subparagraph (d) of Article II of the Interstate Corrections Compact, to any
institution within or without this state if this state has entered into any
contracts for the confinement of inmates in said institutions pursuant to
Article III of that Compact.
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-2, enacted by L.
1982, ch. 38, § 1; 1985, ch. 212, 8 26.

77-28a-3. Duties and powers of courts, departments,
agencies and officers in enforcing and effecting
compact.
The courts, departments, agencies and officers of this state and its political
subdivisions shall enforce this Compact and shall do all things necessary and
appropriate to the effectuation of the purposes and intent of this Compact
which may be within their respective jurisdictions including, but not limited
to, the making and submission of any reports required by that Compact.
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-3, enacted by L.
1982, ch. 38, 8 1.
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Board of Pardons and Parole — Authority to
hold hearings.

The Board of Pardons and Parole is hereby authorized and directed to hold
such hearings as may be requested by any other party state pursuant to Article
I V(a) of the Interstate Corrections Compact. The board is further authorized to
travel to any state which is a party to that Compact and to which an inmate is
sent for confinement, for the purpose of holding any hearing to which that
inmate is entitled by the laws of Utah.
1 M J " 5 ? I L C ' s 1 ? 5 ? ^ ! * 2 ! 8 " ? ; e f a ^ t e d b y L*
l L n A ™ „ , VJ
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Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, substituted "Board

77-28a-5.

°f

P a r d 0 n S a n d Parole

* f o r * B o a r d o f Pardons"
near the
b a n n i n g of the Bection and made two
stylistic changes

Governor — Power to enter into contracts.

The governor is empowered to enter into such contracts on behalf of thi«
state as may be appropriate to implement its participation in the Interstate
corrections Compact pursuant to Article III thereof.
History: C. 1963, 77-28a-5, enacted by L.
1982, ch. 38, § 1; 1983, eh. 320, § 92.

CHAPTER 28b
INTERJURISDICTIONAL TRANSFER OF
PRISONERS
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77-28b-i,

77-28b-9.

Qffice

of

(1) "Assurance" means a special condition concerning the confinement or
release of an offender which must be met prior to the release of the offender
(2) "Offender* means a juvenile certified to be tried as an adult or an adult
convicted of any criminal offense under Utah law.
(3) "Receiving country* means the jurisdiction to which the offender is to be
transferred.
(4) "Sending state" means the jurisdiction from which the offender is to be
ransferred.
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77-28b-2. Director's authority.
The director of the Department of Corrections may transfer offenders having
foreign citizenship status to countries of citizenship under this chapter if a
treaty exists between the United States and the foreign country.
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-2, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 324, § 2.

f 7-28b-3. Eligibility criteria for international transfer.
An offender must meet the following criteria before he may be considered for
an international transfer:
(1) the offender is a citizen of the receiving country;
(2) the offender consents to transfer to his country of citizenship;
(3) the offense committed by the offender constitutes a criminal offense
under the laws of the receiving state;
(4) the offender does not have fewer than 12 months remaining on his
sentence at the time of the application for transfer;
(5) the offender is not under a sentence of death;
(6) the offender does not have collateral attacks or appeals on either the
sentence or conviction pending;
(7) all other provisions of the imposed sentence such as fines, restitution, and penalties are paid in full;
(8) there are no detainers, wanted notices based on criminal convictions, indictments, informations, complaints, or parole or probation violation allegations pending against the offender; and
(9) the offender meets all of the eligibility requirements of the treaty
with his country.
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-3, enacted toy L.
1990, ch. 324, § 3.

Definitions,

History: C. 1953, 77-28b-l, enacted by L.
1900, ch, 324, § 1.

77-28b-4

f 7-28b-4.

Role of the classification officer.

(1) The classification officer of each correctional institution shall be provided
with the eligibility requirements of each prisoner transfer treaty.
(2) The classification officer shall forward Form I, Transfer Inquiry, to all
offenders identified as having national or citizenship status in a party nation.
(3) Upon receipt of Form I, Transfer Inquiry, the offender may indicate he is:
(a) interested in pursuing a transfer by signing Form I and returning it
to the classification officer along with proof of citizenship; or
(b) not interested in pursuing a transfer by returning Form I to the
classification officer without proof of citizenship.
(4) If the offender indicates on Form I, Transfer Inquiry, that he is
interested in pursuing a transfer, the institution classification officer shall
complete Form II, Inmate Information Provided to Treaty Nation, and Form
III, Notice Regarding International Prisoner Transfer.
(5) The following forms, provided by the federal government, shall be
completed and forwarded in triplicate by the classification officer to the
superintendent of the institution:
(a) Form I, Transfer Inquiry;
(b) Form II, Inmate Information Provided to Treaty Nation;
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(c) Form III, Notice Regarding International Prisoner Transfer;
(d) proof of citizenship;
(e) statement of offender's eligibility;
(f) presentence report;
(g) classification assessment;
(h) current psychological and medical reports;
(i) signed release of confidential information forms;
(j) criminal history sheet; and
(k) judgments of conviction or certification to be tried as an adult.
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-4, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 324, 9 4.

77-28b-5. Role of institution warden.
The warden shall sign Form III, Notice Regarding International Prisoner
Transfer, and forward the application and the material required in Section
77-28b-4 in triplicate to the Department of Corrections Inmate Placement
Program Bureau.
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-5, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 324, § S.

77-28b-6. Role of Inmate Placement Program Bureau.
(1) The Department of Corrections Inmate Placement Program Bureau
shall:
(a) investigate the request to ensure that all eligibility requirements
are met;
(b) request a records check to verify records listed in Section 77-28b-3;
(c) review application and materials for completeness and compliance
with treaty terms;
(d) develop and recommend assurances, where indicated; and
(e) provide written notification of the transfer request to the following
entities and receive objections or other comments for 15 business days
after sending the notification:
(i) attorney general;
(ii) prosecuting law enforcement agency;
(iii) prosecutor; and
(iv) sentencing court.
(2) If the Inmate Placement Program Bureau investigation determines that
the application and materials are incomplete or do not comply with the terms
of the treaty, the application shall be rejected and returned to the institution
in which the inmate is incarcerated.
(3) If the investigation of the bureau determines the application and
materials are complete and in compliance with the terms of the treaty, the
application and materials shall be forwarded to the director of the Department
of Corrections.
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-6, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 324, § 6.
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77-28b-7. Role of director.
(1) The director of the Department of Corrections shall review the application and materials. Upon his approval the application and materials shall be
forwarded to the governor for authorization to transfer.
(2) Applications that are not approved by the director shall be returned to
the sending institution and the inmate shall be notified.
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-7, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 324, 8 7.

77-28b-8. Referral to the United States Department of
Justice, Office of International Affairs.
(1) Upon receipt of the governor's authorization for international transfer,
the application and materials shall be forwarded to the United States
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, by the Inmate Placement Program Bureau.
(2) The bureau shall notify the inmate and the warden of the sending
institution of the decision of the application for international transfer.
(3) All arrangements regarding the treaty process and proposed assurances
shall be negotiated between the bureau and the United States Department of
Justice, Office of International Affairs.
History: C. 1963, 77-28b-8, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 324, § 8.

77-28b-9. Transfer of offender.
(1) If the inmate is accepted for international transfer by the United States
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, the offender shall be
transported by the Department of Corrections to the federal district court for
a verification hearing to ensure the offender consents to the international
transfer.
(2) The Department of Corrections shall then relinquish jurisdiction over
the offender to the United States Department of Justice.
History: C. 1953, 77-28b-9, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 324, fi 9.

CHAPTER 29
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST
PRISONERS
Section
77-29-1.

Prisoner's demand for disposition
of pending charge — Duties of
custodial officer — Continuance
may be granted — Dismissal of
charge for failure to bring to
trial.

Section
77-29-2.
77-29-3.
77-29-4.
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Duty of custodial officer to inform
prisoner of untried indictments
or informations,
Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons,
Escape of prisoner voids demand.
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77-29-1,

Section
77-29-9.

Interstate agreement on detainers
— Enactment into law — Text of
agreement.
Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined.
Interstate agreement - Duty of

77 29 10,
77.29.11.
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- Application of habitual criminal law.

Interstate agreement — Escape of
prisoner while in temporary
custody.
Interstate agreement — Duty of
warden
Interstate' agreement - Attorney
information agent,

Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.

(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
History; C, 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. IB, § 2,

Cross-References, — Right to speedy trial
Utah Const, Art. I, § 12; } 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Burden of compliance.
Commencement of period.
Delay caused by codefendant's action.
Delay caused by prisoner.

Dismissal with prejudice.
Forfeiture.
G°°& cause for continuance.
Good cause for failure.
Premature request.
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Prosecutor's delay.
Showing of prejudice.
Standard of review.
Warden's delay.
Written demand.

and because defendant failed to show any
prejudice caused by the delay, he was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial
State v. Maestas, 815 R2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App.).
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

Burden of compliance.
The language of Subsection (4) clearly places
the burden of complying with the statute on the
prosecutor. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421
(Utah 1991).

Dismissal with prejudice.
Defendant's convictions were reversed and
the charges against him dismissed with prejudice, where the trial date was set for 218 days
beyond the time defendant filed the notice of
disposition, and the trial court's finding of good
cause could not be supported by a conclusion
that the delay was for the purpose of allowing
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve
their conflicts. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421
(Utah 1991).

Commencement of period.
Ninety-day period for prosecution under former § 77-65-1 commenced on the day defendant notified county attorney of his request for
final disposition of case or cases pending
against him; and the filing of a complaint,
information or indictment did not affect the
commencement of the period. State v. Moore,
521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974).
Motion to dismiss charges against defendant
who was brought to trial 92 days after warden
received notice of his request for final disposition of pending charges was properly denied
since computation of then 90-day time period
commenced from date that notice was delivered
to county attorney and appropriate court. State
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975).
Delay caused by codefendant'e action.
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of
the charges where the trial was delayed beyond
the 120-day time period, and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that there
was good cause for the delay, where the delay
was reasonable and not the result of the prosecution's actions or inactions, but was due to a
codefendant, who was to be jointly tried with
defendant and who was expected to plead guilty
at trial as the result of plea negotiations,
changing his plea to not guilty on the scheduled
trial date. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403 (Utah
1982).
Delay caused by prisoner.
Where statute provided that prisoner be
brought to trial within ninety days of his re
quest for disposition of pending charges, the
ninety-day disposition period was to be ex
tended by the amount of time during which
defendant himself created delay. State v.
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982).
When a defendant causes a trial to be delayed, he temporarily waives the right to a
speedy trial. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1986); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651
(Utah 1991); State v. Sioudonne Phathammavong, 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Ct. App. 1993).
Because defendant's own actions in requesting continuances, changing counsel, and agreeing to postpone trial until after disposition of
pretrial motions were the main cause of delay

Forfeiture.
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have
charges against him dismissed by remaining
silent and failing to request an earlier setting
when trial court set date for trial beyond
ninety-day period required under former § 7765-1; burden of complying with statute rested
on prosecutor. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361,
453 P.2d 158 (1969).
Good cause for continuance.
Where defendant's trial date was originally
set for time within ninety-day period provided
for under former § 77-65-1 but, to accommodate defendant's counsel, was postponed until
five days beyond the statutory period, the order
fixing the trial date was within the authority of
the court since good cause for a continuance
had been shown. State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d
117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970).
Trial court was within its discretion in granting continuance for trial on date 91 days after
defendant had submitted written request for
disposition of pending criminal case where subpoenas had not been issued soon enough to
proceed with trial on original date, despite
defendant's counsel suggesting trial date
within ninety-day period. Danks v. Turner, 28
Utah 2d 277, 501 P.2d 631 (1972).
Good cause for failure.
Defendant, who was charged at a time he had
other cases pending against him and in one of
those cases requested and received psychiatric
examination and who was appointed various
counsel because of necessity and at his own
request, was not denied right to speedy trial.
State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 478 P.2d 326
(1970).
P r e m a t u r e request.
Defendant's request for final disposition was
premature where proceedings had advanced
only to point of filing of complaint against him,
since person accused of felony must plead to
and be tried under information or indictment.
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State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60
(1970).
Defendant, who was not finally tried within
ninety days from date of request made pursuant to former § 77-65-1, was not entitled to
exoneration because his request was premature
since only complaint for felony charge had been
filed, good cause was shown for granting continuance, and insanity defense had precluded
earlier trial. State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37,
475 P.2d 60 (1970).
Parolee who, after being arrested on complaint, filed petition requesting final disposition of case within ninety days was denied relief
under former § 77-65-1, where trial was held
more than ninety days after filing date of petition but within ninety days of filing of information. State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d
274 (1972).
Former § 77-65-1 did not apply to unfiled
charges and defendant was not entitled to assert ninety-day limitation upon prosecution for
any crime discovered or undiscovered he might
have committed. State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah
2d 435, 519 P.2d 244 (1974).

charges against a defendant to be dismissed.
On the contrary, this section clearly provides
that if there is not good cause for the delay, the
court shall order the matter dismissed. State v.
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991).
Standard of review.
The decision not to dismiss under Subsection
(4) is based on a finding of "good cause," as is
the decision to grant a continuance under Subsection (3). Therefore, the same standard of
review should be applied to both subsections.
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991).
Warden's delay.
Any attempt by the warden to retain, beyond
a reasonable time, a prisoner's request for final
disposition of pending charges, his failure to
complete the required certificate, or any attempt to misdirect the request and certificate,
would violate prisoner's right to a speedy trial
and provide a basis for judicial relief. State v.
Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975).
Written demand.
Defendant's reliance on his notice of appearance to commence the running of the 120-day
period within which his trial had to be held was
misplaced since the notice, which merely contained a plea of "not guilty" and a request that
he be granted a trial upon the charge, was not
delivered to the warden, and did not specify the
nature of the charge or the court where the
charge was pending. State v. Viles, 702 P.2d
1175 (Utah 1985).
A letter from defendant's federal probation
officer to a Utah county attorney which did not
specify the nature of the charges pending
against defendant, was merely an inquiry and
did not trigger the statutory right to demand
trial. State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987).

Prosecutor's delay.
A prosecutor's delay in filing charges does not
violate defendant's right to a speedy trial where
no tactical advantage is gained over the defendant, since a strict rule that prosecutors must
file charges as soon as probable cause exists
could result in the charging of innocent people,
and could also hamper the investigation of
crimes. State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711 (Utah
1985).
Showing of prejudice.
Nothing in this section, its predecessor, or
any of the case law under either statute requires a showing of prejudice in order for the

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
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77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of
untried indictments or informations.
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or informations
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment
into law — Text of agreement.
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in
the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
ARTICLE I
The party statesfindthat charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions,
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide
such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability
is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article
IV hereof.
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ARTICLE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the contin=
uance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition
to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served,
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the
state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden,
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on
which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the
prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts
in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for
final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner.
Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by
copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to
the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect,
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in
any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the
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purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to
the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this
agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a
concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the
request,
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of
imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article
V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is
incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment,
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within
which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for
temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion
of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a)
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish
the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served
on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the
prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and
appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the
prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the
request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant
any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery
as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of
imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter
an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary
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custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall
accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial
arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on
the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which
the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any
force or effect.
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the
purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or
more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of
the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and
while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly
used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and
any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner
permitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant
to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody
of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments,
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring
for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall
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govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as
between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and
officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and
its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to
stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.
ARTICLE VII
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when
such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the
withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.
ARTICLE DC
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause,
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the
Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the
validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any
government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If
this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party
hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining
states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable
matters.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

delayed beyond the 120-day period in Article State v. Stillings, 709 P2d 348 (Utah 1985);
rV(c), the defendant cannot assert the delay as State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551 (Utah 1991).
a basis for dismissal of the charges against him.

officer does not meet the requirements of Article 111(a) of this section calling for written
notice to both the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's
jurisdiction. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854
(Utah 1988).
Delivery of one defective notice and a subsequent copy of it to the appropriate out-of-state
authorities, without delivering notice to the
Utah court or the Utah prosecutor, did not
invoke the protections of this agreement nor
did it provide "de facto notice" or substantial
compliance. Crosland v. State, 857 P.2d 943
(Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

Applicability.
—Parole or probation violations.
Compliance standard.
Detainer required.
Jurisdiction retained by sending state.
Notice to prosecutor and court.
Prisoner received under corrections compact.
Sentence interrupted for return to sending
state.
Time limit for trial.
— Between counties.
— Delay caused by defendant.
Applicability.
—Parole or probation violations.
Detainers based on alleged parole or probation violations are not based on "untried indictments, informations, or complaints" and thus
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is inapplicable. State v. Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah
1992).
Compliance standard.
The standard to which administration of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers should be
held is substantial compliance with the terms
of the agreement and fundamental fairness in
the overall result. Hearn v. State, 642 P.2d 757
(Utah 1982).
The substantial compliance doctrine does not
dispense with the need for a written notice and
request by the prisoner under Article IH(b) of
this section. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 (Utah
1988).
Detainer required.
Under Article 111(a) of this section, a detainer
must be lodged against the prisoner before he
can invoke Article III protection. State v. Martin, 765 P.2d 854 (Utah 1988).

Prisoner received u n d e r corrections compact.
Where prisoner was convicted and sentenced
by an Oregon court and was transferred to
Utah for confinement in the Utah State Prison
under the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, § 77-28-1 et seq., and, while prisoner was
in confinement in Utah, California made a
request under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers to Utah officials for temporary custody of prisoner to try him on kidnapping and
rape charges pending in California, Utah officials did not have authority under the Western
Interstate Corrections Compact or the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to transfer custody of prisoner to California without the direction or approval of the Oregon authorities;
California could obtain such approval by making its request directly to Oregon or by having
its request forwarded by the Utah officials to
the Oregon authorities. Gibson v. Morris, 646
E2d 733 (Utah 1982).
Sentence interrupted for return to sending state.
There was substantial compliance with the
terms of this Agreement and no violation of
fundamental fairness in the fact that prisoner's
service of sentence in the receiving state was
interrupted for his return to the sending state
and is to be resumed, pursuant to detainer from
the receiving state, after he completes service
of his sentence in the sending state and an
intervening federal sentence. Hearn v. State,
642 P2d 757 (Utah 1982).

Jurisdiction retained by sending state.
California prisoner's transfer to Utah did not
constitute waiver and relinquishment of jurisdiction by California or satisfaction of the California judgment where the transfer was made
pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers as requested by the prisoner; fact Time limit for trial.
that prisoner entered guilty pleas to misdemeanors and not felonies in Utah, and fact that —Between counties.
Utah sentence provided that time be served in
An arrest warrant filed by one county with a
the county jail with such sentence to run con- sister county does not constitute an Article IV
currently with the California sentence, had no request for temporary custody of a sending
effect on California's continued jurisdiction state's prisoner so as to trigger the 120-dav
over the prisoner. Buchanan v. Hayward, 663 time limit. State v. Stilling, 770 R2d 137 (Utah
P.2d 70 (Utah 1983).
1989).
Notice to prosecutor a n d court.
A communication solely to the prosecuting

—Delay caused by defendant.
If the defendant himself causes the trial to be
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77-29-6. Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined.
The phrase "appropriate court" as used in the agreement on detainers shall,
with reference to the courts of this state, mean any court with criminal
jurisdiction in the matter involved.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-7.

Interstate agreement — Duty of state agencies
and political subdivisions to cooperate.

All courts, departments, agencies, officers and employees of this state and its
political subdivisions are hereby directed to enforce the agreement on
detainers and to cooperate with one another and with other party states in
enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose.
Higtory: C. 1953, 77-29-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-8. Interstate agreement — Application of habitual
criminal law.
Nothing in the agreement on detainers shall be construed to require the
application of the habitual criminal law of this state to any person as a result
of any conviction had in a proceeding brought to final disposition by reason of
the use of said agreement.
History; C, 1953, 77-29-8, enacted by L,
1980, ch. 15, I 2.

Cross-References. — Habitual criminals
§§ 76-8-1001, 76-8-1002.

77-29-9. Interstate agreement — Escape of prisoner while
in temporary custody.
Escape or attempt to escape from custody, whether within or without this
state, while in the temporary custody of an authority of another state acting
p u r s u a n t to the agreement on detainers shall constitute an offense against this
state. Such escape or attempt to escape shall constitute an ofTense to the same
extent and degree as an escape from the institution in which the prisoner was
confined immediately prior to having been released to temporary custody, and
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Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On

July

27, 1990, defendant

was

convicted

counts of Distribution of a Controlled Substance.

of

three

Each was a

second degree felony.
2.

Following

date.

That

request

of defendant's

defendant

did

date

the
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not

verdict,

this
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Court

several

set

times

a

either

trial counsel, Loni Deland,

appear

at

the

date

set.

sentencing
at

the

or because

Eventually,

the

sentencing date was set for January 16, 1990
3.

Sometime after the jury verdict defendant voluntarily

left Utah and went to California.

While there, defendant was

arrested on other charges and incarcerated.
4.

On

January

16, 1990, the

defendant

did

not

appear.

This Court was informed that defendant did not appear because he
was

incarcerated

on other charges

in California.

This

Court

continued sentencing without date pending defendant's return.
5.

The

State

initially

did

not

file

a

detainer

with

California correction authorities.
6.

Defendant

filed

a

180

day

disposition

action was taken on the 180 day notice because

notice.

No

the Salt Lake

County Attorney's Office determined the Utah Code Annotated Sec.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
1990

- ». .-

because

Defendant

.
A-

voluntarily

'.-::..

incarcerated
left

Utah

pending

- . rcr::;a.

mary
However,

h i s sentencing.

He
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voluntarily traveled to California.
acts in California.

He committed new criminal

His arrest and incarceration in California

were a consequence of his voluntary acts.

Therefore, Defendant's

failure to appear for sentencing in Utah was voluntary.
2.

This Court is not convinced that a criminal defendant

has the right to a speedy sentencing.

However, if such a right

exists the four factors articulated for considering a violation
for the right to speedy trial apply.

These

factors are, the

length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion

of

his

right,

and

the

prejudice

to

the

defendant.

However, defendant has failed to make a sufficient showing that
these factors warrant a finding of denial of any right defendant
may have to a speedy sentencing.
verdict

and

the

sentence

was

Although the delay between the
considerable,

it

was

caused

by

defendant's failure to appear for sentencing or else his counsels
request for continuances and then by defendant leaving Utah and
committing other criminal offenses in California.
not assert any right to a speedy sentencing.

Defendant did

Defendant was not

prejudiced by any delay in his sentencing.
3.

Defendant's

request

for

disposition

of

untried

case

within 180 days as provided by UCA 77-29-1 was not an assertion
of defendant's right to speeding sentencing.
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4.

The case of In Re Flint. 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 532 (Utah

1903) is distinguishable from the facts in this case and is not
controlling.
5.
sentence

Defendant cannot divest this Court of jurisdiction to
him

by

voluntarily

absenting

himself

from

the

jurisdiction of this Court prior to imposition of sentence.

ORDER
Having made the above findings of fact and conclusions of
law, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant'af motion is denied.

Elizabeth Hunt
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

hereby

certify

that

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, And Order was
delivered

to

Elizabeth

Hunt,

Attorney

for

Defendant

Rogelio

Limonta Leyva, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84111 on the 7y

day of October, 1994'rT7
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF,
VS

LIMONTA, ROGELIO LEYVA
DEFENDANT.

CASE NUMBER 881908491 FS
DATE JANUARY 16, 1990
JUDGE TIMOTHY R HANSON
COURT REPORTER JODY EDWARDS
COURT CLERK EVT
ATP REED, SCOTT
ATD DELAND, LONI

BEEHIVE BOND
BASED ON NON-APPEARANCE OF DEFENDANT ROGELIO LEYVA LIMONTA
MOTION OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY COURT'S OWN MOTION
IT IS ORDERED THAT A BENCH WARRANT ISSUE FOR SAID DEFENDANT
RETURNALBE FORTHWITH NO BAIL.
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT APPEAR FOR SENTENCING AND THE COURT IS
ADVISED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS INCARCERATED IN SAN BERNADINO, CA,
THE SENTENCING IS CONTINUED WITHOUT DATE.
COPIES TO COUNSEL, APPD AND BEEHIVE BOND
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